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Abstract
When individual actors are involved in a policy process, do they assess and revise their
policy preferences according to their interests or are they open to other forms of
arguments over time? This study examines the effect of policy actors’ interests on
policy learning. It is based on a survey conducted in 2012 among 376 Belgian actors
(from 38 organizations) involved in the European liberalization policy process of two
network industries: the rail and electricity sectors. Borrowing from organizational
research and behavioral economics, several hypotheses are drawn from a model of
the individual shared by various policy approaches, such as the advocacy coalition
framework. A ‘‘simple gain scores’’ approach to the measurement of policy learning
is introduced. Regression analyses show that policy actors align their policy preferences
with the impacts of policies on their own material well-being (personal interests) and
the material prosperity of their organization (organizational interests). This tendency is
independent of the importance that policy actors give to their interests in their every-
day lives. This suggests that policy actors experience a sort of ‘‘interest shift’’ when they
assess their policy preferences over time. This shift, however, exerts a limited influence
on policy learning. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
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Introduction
Policy processes involve diverse types of policy actors, ranging from politicians and
public officials to company and association managers. As a result of various inter-
actions as well as the gradual accumulation of evidence on policy problems over
time, those policy actors acquire, translate, and disseminate new information and
knowledge (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). In turn, they maintain, strengthen, or
revise their beliefs and preferences regarding policies. ‘‘Policy learning’’ is a concept
that designates this cognitive and social dynamic.
Human learning is a fundamental intermediate factor of change processes.
Change requires actors to create or to deal with new information and new experi-
ences. This results in the enduring acquisition or modification of abstract con-
structs (Vandenbos, 2007). Those alterations, in turn, transform actors’
behavioral intentions and their contribution to change (Fishbein and Ajzen,
2010). Hence, policy learning is a causal mechanism linking over time the beliefs
held by individual policy actors, the revision of those beliefs, the alterations of
collective ideas, and policy change.
The present study focuses on the psychological conditions of individual learning
within one policy domain. In particular, it examines whether individual policy
actors align, over time, their policy preferences with the effect of policy programs
on their own interests. I distinguish two categories of interests: the personal inter-
ests of individual policy actors refer to their own material well-being whereas their
organizational interests refer to the material prosperity of the organization in
which they work.
A better theorization of the psychological factors of policy learning is crucial
because it helps to understand its relation with policy change. For example, there
are indications that policy actors who acquire more knowledge about a policy
problem are more open to considering new, different policy solutions to solving
this problem (Leach et al., 2014). Individual policy learning also has other possible
corollary outcomes, such as simplifying the emergence of shared interpretations of
policy issues or facilitating agreements among policy actors (Brummel et al., 2010;
Diduck et al., 2012; Leach et al., 2014). Finally, learning has a ‘‘strategic charac-
ter’’, as it can help ‘‘policy participants to promote their respective policy interests
and values’’ (Real-Dato, 2009: 129).
To examine the effect of interests in individual policy learning, I rely on the
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). This
approach is most often used to examine the role that coalitions of policy actors
struggling with each other play in policy processes. However, the ACF also recog-
nizes that policy change depends on policy learning. To scrutinize the role
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of cognition in policy processes, the ACF relies on a model of the individual
characterized by a bounded rationality and two logics of normative reasoning: a
logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness (Sabatier and Weible, 2007).
There are at least two reasons to rely on the ACF in this study. First, the effect
of interests on policy learning and policy change has been a long-standing but
unresolved debate, in the ACF literature (e.g., Elliott and Schlaepfer, 2001; Hsu,
2005; Ku¨bler, 2001; Leach and Sabatier, 2005; Nohrstedt, 2005; Sabatier et al.,
1987). Second, many policy approaches share with the ACF similar assumptions on
individual actors (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013; Zito and Schout, 2009). However,
the ACF assumptions are particularly detailed. Hence, the implications of those
assumptions are clearly testable. This makes the ACF a very good choice to exam-
ine the effect of policy actors’ interests on the revision of their policy preferences
over time.
The hypotheses of this study are not only based on the ACF. They also come
from research in political psychology on the role of interests in citizens’ social and
political attitudes (e.g., Lau and Heldman, 2009; Margalit, 2013; Martinussen,
2008; Sears and Funk, 1991), in organizational psychology on bounded rationality
(Greve, 2011; Robbins et al., 2013; Simon, 1991), and in behavioral economics on
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; for a review, see Barberis, 2012).
This research helps drawing the implications of the ACF model of the individual.
The test of the hypotheses is based on regression analyses of a survey conducted
in 2012 among 376 Belgian policy actors who had been involved, during the last
two decades, in the European liberalization policy process of two network indus-
tries: the rail and electricity sectors. The European Social Survey suggests that
Belgian policy actors are representative of many of their European colleagues
regarding the importance they give to their interests in their everyday lives.1 The
liberalization process of network industries offers a good balance between policy
changes concerning how to provide products/services to citizens and changes in the
interests of policy actors that result from the re-organization of the industries.
As the liberalization of network industries began in the 1990s, this research is
also consistent with Sabatier’s (1993) contention that policy processes should be
considered ‘‘over a decade or more’’ to capture the real nature of policy learning.
This study contributes to the policy science in various ways. First of all, much
policy learning research (e.g., Jacobs and Barnett, 2000; Meseguer, 2004;
Pemberton, 2003) looks at the entire mechanism linking human cognition and
policy learning to policy change. In contrast, this study clarifies the effect of
human cognition on policy learning itself. In addition, this study introduces an
innovative, ‘‘simple gain scores’’ approach to the measurement of policy learning.
Second, many studies account for policy processes by looking at interests
together with beliefs or ideas (e.g., Dehnhardt, 2014). Following calls for research
focusing on the exact influence of interests (e.g., Hoberg, 1996; Nohrstedt, 2005),
I try to reject the null hypothesis that interests do not exert any influence on policy
learning. In addition, most researchers oppose interests to beliefs and ideas. In this
study, I recognize the ideational character of interests by using self-reported
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measures of interests. This is far more reliable than proxy measures of interests
deduced by the researcher on the basis of policy actors’ characteristics or affili-
ations (Darke and Chaiken, 2005).
Third, the role of actors’ interests in policy processes has been a perennial issue
in the policy science (Be´land, 2009; Genieys and Smyrl, 2008). In addition, the ACF
shares its model of the individual with various other approaches to the policy
process, as well as many public administration and public management studies.
Hence, the findings of this study talk to diverse researchers in public policy and
administration, within and beyond the ACF community.
This article should be understood as part of the efforts to develop a behavioral
approach to the study of public policy (Shafir, 2013). The findings of this article
will shed light on the psychological conditions of individual-level policy learning.
In terms of significance, this means that this article does not make any assumption
about the ultimate influence of policy actors’ interests on group-level policy learn-
ing or on collective action. The actual impact of individual learning on collective
processes depends on social interactions, organizational practices, and institutional
contexts in which it takes place (e.g., Witting and Moyson, 2015). In the same
perspective, there are not only psychological conditions to individual-level policy
learning, but also social, organizational, and institutional factors (Dunlop and
Radaelli, 2017). However, research efforts to clarify the behavioral foundations
of public policy are crucial because decision-making processes based on bad intui-
tive psychology are less likely to succeed (Shafir, 2013).
This article follows a classical structure in which the theoretical expectations are
presented before the research design, the measures, and the analysis. Finally, the
findings are discussed.
The role of interests in long-term policy learning
Policy learning and policy change in the advocacy coalition framework
The ACF (Sabatier, 1987; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999; Sabatier and
Weible, 2007) conceptualizes the policy process as a political struggle among (coali-
tions of) policy actors involved in a given policy subsystem. A policy subsystem is a
set of ‘‘actors from various public and private organizations who are actively
concerned with a policy problem or issue such as air pollution control, and who
regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain’’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1999: 119).
The ACF assumes that each policy actor holds a belief system composed of three
strata. At the first stratum, ‘‘deep core’’ beliefs are very broad in scope (e.g.,
‘‘I believe that justice is an important value’’). At the second stratum, ‘‘policy
core’’ beliefs are specific to one subsystem (e.g., ‘‘I believe that this policy option
increases the degree of justice among groups of the population’’) and determine
actors’ preferences regarding key policies (e.g., ‘‘I believe that this policy option is
better than others’’). At the third stratum, ‘‘secondary’’ beliefs concern particular
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issues and decisions within the subsystem (e.g., ‘‘I believe that this administrative
decision facilitates the implementation of my preferred policy option’’).
One important objective of the ACF is to explain policy change, defined as
‘‘fluctuations in the dominant belief systems (i.e., those incorporated into public
policy)’’ (Sabatier, 1987: 682). For example, policy change can result from major
‘‘shifts in the core attributes of the subsystem’’, called ‘‘shocks’’, such as a legal
shock or a shock in the distribution of natural resources (Weible et al., 2009: 124).
Policy actors can also use their resources and coordinate their political activity
within ‘‘advocacy coalitions’’ to impose an understanding of policy problems
and their preferred definition of policy solutions to other advocacy coalitions
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
However, policy change does not only depend on shocks and power relations
but also on the beliefs and preferences held by policy actors. The revision of those
preferences is a causal mechanism called ‘‘policy learning’’, which determines
policy decisions. The ACF defines policy learning as ‘‘relatively enduring alter-
ations of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and
which are concerned with the attainment or revision of the precepts of the belief
system of individuals or of collectivities’’ (Sabatier, 1993: 42).
The belief system of a policy actor (or any individual) is composed of predictive
beliefs and evaluative beliefs (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). In the context of policy
processes, predictive beliefs concern the expected outcomes of policy programs
(e.g., ‘the liberalization policy will allow new companies to operate trains on the
Belgian railways’). In common language as well as in psychological and educa-
tional research, the term ‘learning’ most often refers to a process that leads an
individual to revise his or her predictive beliefs as a result of knowledge acquisition
or social interactions. In the ACF, however, ‘‘policy learning’’ is a broader concept:
it equally denotes the cognitive and social processes that lead to changes in the
evaluative beliefs of policy actors. Evaluative beliefs concern the desirability of the
outcomes of policy processes (e.g., ‘‘it would be desirable that new companies are
allowed to operate trains’’) and, ultimately, the desirability of policies themselves
(e.g., ‘‘the liberalization policy would be desirable’’). The latter are called ‘‘policy
preferences’’.
Some ACF research has looked at the conditions of cross-coalition policy learn-
ing or the role of policy learning in policy change (Weible et al., 2009). However,
the psychology of individual learning has been rather overlooked. Here, I focus on
one result of individual learning: the stability or evolution of policy actors’ pref-
erences over time. This is the dependent variable of this study. In this respect, the
study adopts a centered perspective on policy actors’ evaluative beliefs. But policy
preferences have been recognized as ‘‘normative beliefs that project an image of
how the policy subsystem ought to be, provide the vision that guides coalition
strategic behavior, and helps unite allies and divide opponents’’ (Sabatier and
Weible, 2007: 195). As policy preferences play a fundamental role in collective
action, it is crucial to understand the psychological foundations of their evolution
over time.
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The nature of interests
Following a consistent body of research in political psychology on the role of
interests in citizens’ social and political attitudes (e.g., Lau and Heldman, 2009;
Margalit, 2013; Martinussen, 2008), the interests of a given entity—for example, an
individual or an organization—may be defined in reference to the material well-
being or prosperity of this entity. Restricting interests to material aspects allows for
more clarity regarding other concepts such as values (Sears and Funk, 1991).
It has been suggested that interests should be analyzed in opposition to beliefs in
order to understand their respective role in policy processes (Hoberg, 1996: 143;
Nohrstedt, 2005: 1045–1046). In contrast, I follow Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s
(1993: 28) original argument that interests are subjective beliefs among others:
‘‘while belief system models can (. . .) incorporate self-interest and organizational
interests, they also allow actors to establish goals in quite different ways (e.g., as a
result of socialization)’’. Similarly, Laird (1999) argued that ‘‘actors use ideas in
order to understand what their interests are, what those interests mean to them,
and how to achieve them’’ (cited by Dudley, 2007: 411).
Yet, if interests are beliefs, how are they to be distinguished from other beliefs?
Two different concepts may be used: ‘‘policy interests’’ and the ‘‘generalized
importance of interests’’. On the one hand, policy interests are beliefs about the
impacts of a policy on someone’s material well-being (e.g., ‘‘I believe that
the implementation of this policy has improved my salary’’). On the other hand,
the generalized ‘‘importance’’ or ‘‘salience’’ of interests indicates how much they
motivate someone’s attitudes and preferences. Policy interests are policy core
beliefs—they are specific to the policies of a given policy subsystem—whereas the
generalized importance of interests results from a set of deep core beliefs—they are
general in scope.
Finally, policy interests and the generalized importance of interests can concern
personal interests or organizational interests. Personal policy interests of individual
policy actors are their beliefs about the impacts of a policy on their own material
well-being (e.g., ‘‘I believe that this policy will increase my personal working con-
ditions’’). Organizational policy interests are their beliefs about the impacts of a
policy on the material prosperity of the organization which they are affiliated to
(e.g., ‘‘I believe that this policy will improve the financial situation of my organ-
ization’’). Similarly, I differentiate the generalized importance given by policy
actors to their personal and organizational interests.
Most studies looking at the influence of interests on social and political attitudes
focus on personal interests (e.g., Lau and Heldman, 2009). Sometimes, typically in
studies assimilating parties’ electoral performance to interests (e.g., Gilardi, 2010),
personal and organizational interests are measured together. Indeed, electoral suc-
cesses serve the interests of individuals as well as the interests of their party.
However, as the theoretical and practical implications resulting from the effect of
personal and organizational interests might not be similar, I define them differently
and measured them with different questions, in the survey of this research.
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Theoretical expectations on the relation between interests and policy
learning
The ACF model of the individual is based on two important assumptions that lead
to contradictory expectations regarding the role of interests in policy learning. The
first assumption is that the belief system of policy actors is internally coherent
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In particular, policy actors develop over
time a specialized knowledge which allows them to formulate policy preferences
that are consistent with their beliefs. This suggests that they are naturally able to
opt for policies that fit their interests (e.g., ‘‘I believe that my personal interests are
important and I believe that this policy improves my material well-being, so
I believe that it is a desirable policy’’).
However, the second important assumption of the ACF is recognizing that
individuals’ rationality is ‘‘bounded’’ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). This assumption
results from a ‘‘behavioralist turn’’ (Zito and Schout, 2009) adopted by the ACF in
parallel with many other approaches to the policy process (Dunlop and Radaelli,
2013), and borrowed from organizational research (Simon, 1991; see also Greve,
2011; Robbins et al., 2013) as well as behavioral economics (prospect theory:
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; see also Kahneman, 2011; for a review, see
Barberis, 2012). Bounded rationality suggests that policy actors’ ability to formu-
late policy preferences that are consistent with their beliefs is limited. Indeed, the
information available about policies can be of poor quality or low quantity. In
addition, the inherent ability of individuals to process this information is limited,
especially in contexts of uncertainty or urgency (Birkland, 2006; Moynihan, 2008;
Svenson and Maule, 1993).
When information, time or ability to process information is limited, prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) suggests that individuals tend to rely on
‘‘shortcuts’’ or heuristic-based modes of reasoning. For example, due to a so-called
‘‘devil shift’’, policy actors tend to exaggerate the political risk represented by other
actors having different policy preferences: they see those actors as more evil and
powerful than they are in reality (Leach and Sabatier, 2005; Sabatier et al., 1987).
The devil shift results from cognitive biases such as risk aversion or loss aversion,
meaning that individuals dislike risks and losses more than they like certitudes and
gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Similarly, as a result of the ‘‘certainty effect’’
(Kahneman, 2011;McGraw et al., 2010), policy actors generally prefer to rely on their
pre-existing normative and perceptual beliefs rather than admitting that they are
wrong (Leach et al., 2014; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). All in all, bounded
rationality sheds skepticism on policy actors’ propensity to changing their policy pref-
erences over time and to revising them in a way that fits their policy beliefs. Hence,
the null hypothesis of this research states that policy actors do not significantly tend to
align their policy preferences with their interests over time.
However, despite the lack of extensive empirical evidence, there are several
reasons to think that policy actors are rational enough to maintain consistency
between their policy preferences and their policy interests over time. First, some
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ACF research suggests that interests are a tangible driver of policy processes, with
an impact on the formation and behavior of advocacy coalitions (e.g., Elliott and
Schlaepfer, 2001; Hsu, 2005; Ku¨bler, 2001) as well as policy change (Hoberg, 1996;
Nohrstedt 2005). However, in those studies, the concept of ‘‘interest’’ covers very
diverse empirical realities. In addition, the ideational character of interests is not
always really well recognized in their definition and measurement.
Second, the role of interests in the formation of citizens’ social and political
attitudes was demonstrated by a consistent body of research in political psychology
(e.g, Lau and Heldman, 2009; Margalit, 2013; Martinussen, 2008; Sears and Funk,
1991). However, those studies are inconclusive about the strength of the interests–
attitudes connection.
Third, as explained above, policy actors’ ability to opt for policy decisions that
are consistent with their interests is limited in contexts characterized by uncertainty
or urgency (Birkland, 2006; Moynihan, 2008). However, the members of a policy
subsystem are, for the most part, experienced policy ‘‘elites’’. For this reason,
‘‘there are strong grounds for assuming that most actors will have relatively com-
plex and internally consistent belief systems’’ (Sabatier, 1993: 181). In addition, the
present study focuses on long-term policy learning. In the long run, policy actors
should have more opportunities to structure and organize their policy knowledge.
This should allow them to align their policy preferences with their interests, which
leads me to the first alternative hypothesis of this research: in the long run, policy
actors tend to align their policy preferences with their policy interests.
Furthermore, the ACF borrows from organizational research (March and
Olsen, 2008) that policy actors’ attitudes are not only driven by interests but also
by a logic of appropriateness (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). This means that the
course of policy actors’ preferences is determined, not only by interests, but also by
various other internalized values, norms, and rules. In other words, policy actors
can differ from each other with respect to the generalized importance they give to
their interests. If policy actors are internally coherent, the more they give import-
ance to their interests in their everyday lives, the more they should align their policy
preferences with their policy interests. This leads me to the second alternative
hypothesis: the relation between the revision of policy actors’ preferences and
their policy interests should be stronger when policy actors give more importance
to their interests in their everyday lives. In statistical terms, this means that the
importance that policy actors give to their interests would ‘moderate’ the relation
between policy interests and policy preferences over time.
As the influence of personal and organizational interests is assessed separately,
each alternative hypothesis has two versions, summarized in Table 1 and repre-
sented in Figure 1.
Research design
To examine the role played by interests in policy learning, a web survey was
submitted to the Belgian policy actors involved in the implementation of the
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European liberalization policy process within two network industries: the rail and
electricity sectors. Network industries ‘‘are characterized by the delivery of prod-
ucts or services to final customers via a ‘network infrastructure’ linking upstream
supply with downstream customers’’ (European Commission, 1999). Network
industries are typical in sectors like telecommunications, energy, transport, or
postal services.
Since the 1980s, many network industries have been subject to a liberalization
policy process (Genoud, 2004; Geradin, 2006). The implementation of this
European process in national policy subsystems may be considered a major
policy change. Gradually, the network activities have been unbundled.
Policy core beliefs
Generalized importance of interests 
in everyday life 
Policy interests
Generalized 
importance of 
pers. interests
Generalized 
importance of 
org. interests
Personal 
policy interests
Organizational 
policy interests
REVISION OF POLICY PREFERENCES 
(outcome of policy learning)
H2.1 
H2.2
H1.1 H1.2
Deep core beliefs 
Figure 1. Analytical framework and alternative hypotheses of the study.
Table 1. Alternative hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1.1 (Effect of personal policy interests):
Policy actors align their policy preferences with their personal policy interests over time.
Hypothesis 1.2 (Effect of organizational policy interests):
Policy actors align their policy preferences with their organizational policy interests over time.
Hypothesis 2.1 (Moderation effect of the generalized importance of personal interests):
The relation between personal policy interests and the revision of policy preferences over time is stronger
when policy actors give more importance to their personal interests in their everyday lives.
Hypothesis 2.2 (Moderation effect of the generalized importance of organizational interests):
The relation between organizational policy interests and the revision of policy preferences over time is
stronger when policy actors give more importance to their organizational interests in their everyday
lives.
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Previously, a state-owned company (or ‘‘incumbent’’) had a monopoly on the
management and commercial exploitation of the network. Nowadays, a public
‘‘infrastructure manager’’ is responsible for the maintenance and security of the
infrastructure, whereas the incumbent competes with other private companies (or
‘‘new entrants’’) for use of the infrastructure. In addition, various independent
regulatory agencies have been created at European and national levels.
This study focuses on two national subsystems of policy actors: the Belgian rail
and electricity policy subsystems. In the railways, the European liberalization pro-
cess began in 1991, with European directive 91/440/EEC. The implementation of
this process, in Belgium, began with the Royal decree of 5 February 1997 (for more
details, see Dehousse and Gadisseur, 2002; Moyson and Aubin, 2011). A similar
process of liberalization of the European electricity sector was launched with dir-
ective 96/92/EC. The implementation of this process, in Belgium, began with the
Federal Law of 29 April 1999 (for more details, see Declercq, 2000; Declercq and
Vincent, 2000a, 2000b; Glachant and Perez, 2011).
The web survey was administered between April and November 2012 to 1256
people holding top to middle positions within 51 public and private organizations
involved in the liberalization process. Given their position, those people had been
regularly involved in the implementation process of the European liberalization
policy: they form two policy subsystems.2 The response rate of the survey was
32.88% (413 policy actors out of 38 organizations). This is very good, considering
that web surveys conducted with email invitations and one reminder typically reach
a response rate of 25% (Kaplowitz et al., 2004).3 The survey invitation was per-
sonally addressed to each of the invitees (‘‘Dear Mr./Ms. ‘Name of the invitee’,’’)
and sent to their individual, professional email address. Hence, it can fairly be
assumed that the survey was filled by the invitees themselves. Together with the
results of the survey, the anonymous ID of survey participants was provided, along
with their language (French or Dutch), their gender, as well as their hierarchical
level within their organization of affiliation. On those dimensions, the distributions
of the sample and the population are similar, which suggests the sample is well
representative.
Measures
Dependent variable
The evolution of respondents’ policy preferences was measured with the ‘‘simple
gain scores’’ method. Respondents were requested to report their initial policy
preferences with the following question: ‘‘At the beginning of the liberalization
process or—if later—when you were involved in the Belgian rail/electricity sector
for the first time, what was your position about the following major principles of
this policy?’’ Four Likert-type items ranging from ‘‘Very unfavorable’’ [2] to
‘‘Very favorable’’ [+2] were submitted in each sector. In each sector, the two
following items were used: ‘‘the application of regulation by independent
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regulatory bodies’’ (item 1); and ‘‘the unbundling of operations on and manage-
ment of infrastructure’’ (item 2). In the rail sector, two additional items were
submitted: ‘‘the introduction of competition in the railway transport of freight
(item 3 rail) / international railway transport of passengers (item 4 rail)’’. In the
electricity sector, the additional items were: ‘‘the introduction of competition in the
generation and supply of high-voltage electricity (item 3 electricity)/low-voltage
electricity (item 4 electricity)’’.
Then, the respondents were invited to report their current policy preferences
with the following question: ‘‘And today, what is your position about the following
principles?’’ The items used for reporting the initial preferences were submitted
again. To get an idea of how respondents’ preferences evolved over time, initial
preferences’ values were retrenched from current preferences’ values. This provided
a new list of items or ‘‘gain scores’’—four in the railways and four in the electricity
sector. Those scores measure the evolution of respondents’ policy preferences
toward the liberalization between the beginning of this policy process and 2012
(i.e., the year of the survey). For example, a minimum score of [4] indicates a
respondent who had a very positive opinion [+2] about a liberalization principle
at the beginning of the policy process and turned out to be very negative [2]
about this principle in 2012. Inversely, a respondent got a maximum score of
[+4] when his extremely negative opinion [2] had become extremely positive
[+2] in 2012.
Factor analyses were conducted on the list of four gain scores, in each sector
separately. The exploratory factor analysis suggested to keep all scores in each
sector. The confirmatory factor analysis validated this structure in the rail sector
(2¼ 0.21, p¼ 0.90; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)¼ 0.00;
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR)¼ 0.014; comparative fit index
(CFI)¼ 1.00) as well as in the electricity sector (2¼ 0.69, p¼ 0.71;
RMSEA¼ 0.00; SRMR¼ 0.009; CFI¼ 1.00).4 The scores of the two factors were
normalized to get one scale common to the two sectors. This scale ranges from
[6.99] to [+6.99]. This is the dependent variable of the present study. The items of
the dependent variable, as well as their statistics, are reported in Appendix 1.
A cross-sectional survey comparing retrospective and contemporary data is not
the best possible tool for assessing the evolution of policy actors’ preferences over
time. A panel survey, for example, could be even more appropriate. Still, this study
offers a valid and reliable method that significantly improves existing approaches to
the measurement of policy learning for two reasons.
First, the simple gain scores method overcomes the two possible types of sys-
tematic error in the measurement of policy learning. The first possible type of
systematic error concerns the measurement of preferences change. In particular,
respondents could be tempted to provide socially desirable answers—e.g. respond-
ents willing to show that they are stable and reliable people or, on the contrary,
that they are able to change their minds. The second possible type of systematic
error concerns the measurement of policy preferences themselves. In particular, the
survey concerned professional issues and was distributed in a professional context.
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Hence, there are good reasons to suspect respondents’ willingness to appear more
or less favorable to the liberalization process when he or she worked among col-
leagues militating for/against this policy, for example.
The existing studies which measured policy learning are relatively scarce and
relied, most often, on one set of items on preferences change (‘‘did you change your
opinion on. . .’’: e.g., Montpetit, 2007). Such an approach does not control for any
type of measurement error mentioned above. In the simple gain scores method, in
contrast, two sets of items—one about past preferences and one about current
preferences—are used and compared by the researcher. On the one hand, this
drastically decreases the ability of respondents to strategize regarding the social
desirability of the reported changes in their preferences. On the other hand, the
simple gain scores approach does not remove systematic error in the measurement
of preferences themselves. However, simple gain scores modeling of preferences
change protects regression results from the possible effects of such a measurement
error—it provides unbiased results (see below).
Second, this study addresses recollection issues. Indeed, it can be difficult to
remember past preferences (Janson, 1990). However, a confident attitude toward
memory is a reasonable indicator of its accuracy (Roediger, 2012). In turn, con-
viction is a reliable indicator of attitude confidence/certainty (Holland et al., 2003).
Hence, respondents were also asked to report their degree of conviction in their
policy preferences on a five-point Likert scale. The respondents who reported to be
‘‘completely unconvinced’’ [2] or ‘‘rather unconvinced’’ [1] of their past or cur-
rent preferences were removed from the sample (32 respondents were removed).
In addition, this study focuses on policy actors which have been involved in the
European liberalization process for a long time. As this process has been a major
and long-term policy change in network industries, there are good reasons to think
that policy actors have good memories of their past preferences regarding this
change. Indeed, research in cognitive psychology suggests that the importance of
an event or process, as well as the number of opportunities to hear and discuss it,
increases the accuracy of memories on past opinions toward it (Kvavilashvili et al.,
2003; Neisser et al., 1996).
Independent variables
Personal policy interests were operationalized with three aspects of the policy
actors’ own material well-being which were likely to have been influenced by the
liberalization process: their salary (like in Martinussen, 2008), but also their mater-
ial working conditions and promotion possibilities. Whether these aspects had
actually been influenced by the liberalization process over time was assessed by
the respondents themselves, with Likert-scale items, ranging from ‘‘Strongly dis-
agree’’ [2] to ‘‘Strongly agree’’ [+2]. The aggregation of these items results in the
ordinal variable ‘‘Personal policy interests’’ ranging from [6: ‘‘the liberalization
policy has influenced my personal interests very negatively’’] to [+6: ‘‘the liberal-
ization policy has influenced my personal interests very positively’’].
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Similarly, organizational policy interests were operationalized with two aspects
of the material prosperity of policy actors’ organization which were likely to have
been influenced by the liberalization process: its finances as well as its success. The
aggregation of Likert-scale items results in the ordinal variable ‘‘organizational
policy interests’’ ranging from [4: ‘‘the liberalization policy has influenced the
material prosperity of my organization very negatively’’] to [+4: ‘‘the liberalization
policy has influenced the material prosperity of my organization very positively’’].
The generalized importance of interests may be expressed by subjective beliefs
(Clore and Schnall, 2005). For example, ‘‘I believe that earning a good salary is
very important’’ is a good indicator that personal interests are important for an
individual. The importance given to salary, but also professional opportunities and
material working conditions, was assessed by each respondent thanks to three
Likert-type items. The aggregation of these items results in the ordinal variable
‘‘importance of personal interests’’, ranging from [6: ‘‘I don’t pay any importance
to my personal interests’’] to [+6: ‘‘I pay a great deal of importance to my personal
interests’’]. The importance given to the finances and success of the organization
were assessed by each respondent thanks to two Likert-type items. The aggregation
of these items results in the ordinal variable ‘‘importance of organizational inter-
ests’’ ranging from [4: ‘‘I don’t pay any importance to my organizational inter-
ests’’] to [+4: ‘‘I pay a great deal of importance to my organizational interests’’].
All independent variables have a cronbach alpha equal to, or higher than 0.70
(see Appendix 1). This study also accounts for the sector in which the respondent
worked (rail sector¼ 0; electricity sector¼ 1) as well as several covariates: gender
(male¼ 0; female¼ 1), age (from less than 20 year old¼ 1; to more than 70 year
old¼ 12; by intervals of 5 years) and educational level (1¼ secondary education or
less; 2¼ undergraduate; 3¼ graduate or more). Battaglio and Legge (2009;
Battaglio, 2009) also suggested that ‘‘satisfaction with democracy’’ and ‘‘political
curiosity’’ (called ‘‘political interest’’, in their own study) are two political predis-
positions regarding liberalization processes. These variables were measured with
the two following Likert-type items: ‘‘I find that the Belgian democracy works well
these days’’ and ‘‘I am interested in politics’’.
Analysis
The summary statistics, in Table 2, show that policy actors’ preferences have not
evolved very much over time. This is especially true in the railway sector, with a
mean close to 0, and consistent with previous findings (e.g., Leach et al., 2014;
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). This does not decrease the importance of exam-
ining the role of interests in policy learning: in fact, interests can be a factor that
limits changes in policy actors’ preferences. On average, with a mean of 1.63, policy
actors’ opinions regarding the liberalization policy have evolved more positively in
the electricity sector than in the rail sector. A possible explanation is that the
liberalization process has been deeper and has become more consensual in the
electricity sector than in the rail sector, where the monopoly of the incumbent
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on the national transport of passengers is still applicable but discussed.
Furthermore, in the two sectors, the standard deviation suggests quite much
inter-individual variation. Covariates have approximately the same means in
each sector, except that policy actors are older in the rail sector than in the elec-
tricity sector. Gender was introduced as a numeric (dummy) variable, in the regres-
sion analyses. Concretely, there are 27 female respondents in the rail sector and 30
in the electricity sector.
Out of the 413 survey respondents, 32 were removed because they were not
confident enough about their past policy preferences (see above) and five others
were removed because they did not provide any answer to one or more questions
used for constructing the independent variables. The missing values of gender, age,
and educational level were replaced by their mean (consistent with Allison, 2002).
Hence, the final sample is composed of 376 respondents: 185 in the rail sector and
191 in the electricity sector. They come from 38 different organizations: 12 in the
rail sector and 26 in the electricity sector.
To analyze the role played by interests in policy learning, this study relies on
simple gain scores modeling, in which the difference between respondents’ final and
initial preferences is regressed on the independent variables. In ‘‘residual gain
scores’’ modeling, in contrast, the initial attitudinal level is introduced as a regres-
sor of the final attitudinal level, next to the other independent variables (Allison,
1990). The respective advantages of the two approaches have been subject to much
debate, recent studies suggesting that they most often lead to similar results
(Johnson, 2005). There has been wider consensus, however, that simple gain
scores modeling is more appropriate when some error in the measurement of the
initial attitudinal level is suspected (Johnson, 2005). Indeed, in simple gain scores
modeling, measurement error is entirely within the dependent variable whereas, in
residual gain scores modeling, the error in the measurement of the initial attitudinal
level appears in the independent variables. In the present study, error in the meas-
urement of initial policy preferences is suspected (see above). Hence, the simple
gain scores approach offers a better model specification and unbiased results.
The data were analyzed with clustered robust linear regression models (Fox,
2008), in Table 4. In those models, the distribution of studentized residuals is not
perfectly normal (p value of all Shapiro-Wilk tests< 0.001) and the residuals are
somewhat heteroscedastic (p value of all Cook-Weisberg tests< 0.001). In addition,
there are good reasons to think that organizational affiliation influenced the evolu-
tion policy actors’ preferences regarding the European liberalization policy, given
that this policy had different consequences according to the type of their organiza-
tion. Hence, clustered robust standard errors were used (clusters¼ organizations).5
Despite correlations among independent variables, in Table 3, the variance infla-
tion factors are never higher than 1.15 nor higher than the model-dependent
cut-off values, in Table 4 (Craney and Surles, 2002). This means that the
models do not present any collinearity issue. Consistent with Larzelere et al.
(2010), the analyses were repeated using the residual gain scores approach and
led to similar results.
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Findings
The effect of covariates on the dependent variable is examined before turning to the
results related to the independent variables. Model 0 contains all covariates. This
model is significant but has a small adjusted R-squared (0.06). As a result of higher
‘‘reception skills’’ or society’s greater ‘‘conformity expectations’’, women are
expected to show higher compliance—e.g. to policy decisions—than men (Petty
and Wegener, 1998). The results confirm that female policy actors’ preferences
regarding the European liberalization have evolved more favorably than their
male counterparts. In contrast, there is no evidence about the effect of age or
educational level on policy learning.
I also suspected that the policy actors with a higher political curiosity could have
become more favorable to the liberalization process over time due to the political
nature of this process. Battaglio (2009) also suggested that such a curiosity
increases citizens’ ability to understand complex policies (rather than a tendency
to reject those policies in the absence of such an ability). The results do not confirm
this expectation.
Battaglio and Legge (2009) tested two contradictory hypotheses regarding sat-
isfaction with democracy: ‘‘while it might be guessed that (1) satisfied citizens are
not prone to change, (2) those who are supportive of the political system may have
more confidence and familiarity to know its shortcomings and take steps that they
view as reform, such as privatization’’ (p. 702). Their results show a positive rela-
tion between satisfaction with democracy and support of privatization. In contrast,
Table 3. Correlation matrix of the dependent and independent variables.
Correlation
Importance
of personal
interests
Personal policy
interests in
liberalization
Importance of
organizational
interests
Organizational
policy interests
in liberalization
Evolution
of policy
preferences
on liberalization
Importance of
personal interests
1
Personal policy
interests in
liberalization
0.05 1
Importance of
organizational
interests
0.27** 0.00 1
Organizational
policy interests
in liberalization
0.09+ 0.57** 0.05 1
Evolution of
policy preferences
on liberalization
0.11* 0.23** 0.00 0.23** 1
+p< 0.10; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.001.
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my results show a negative effect of satisfaction with democracy on the evolution of
policy preferences toward the liberalization policy over time. This finding suggests
that the policy actors who feel satisfied with democracy have more confidence and
familiarity with the political system to revise their opinion toward a policy nega-
tively. Interestingly, this effect becomes even more significant when the independent
variables are introduced in models 1–5.
A real but limited influence of policy interests on policy learning
Models 1 and 2 examine the effect of personal policy interests and organizational
policy interests on policy learning. The likelihood ratio tests as well as the decrease
of the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) index suggest that the two models
significantly improve our understanding of the dependent variable, when compared
to model 0. The standard coefficients of the variables demonstrate their substantial
effect on the dependent variable. Hence, hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 are validated:
policy actors do align their policy preferences with their (personal and organiza-
tional) policy interests over time.
For the first time, this study provides support to the ACF’s initial contention
(Sabatier, 1993) that interests drive policy actors’ attitudes toward policies. This
evidence is based on self-reported measures of interests, which reinforces the view
that interests are ideational constructs (Dudley, 2007; Laird, 1999). At the same
time, it suggests that policy actors’ belief system is internally consistent (Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
Interestingly, the results also give an accurate idea to what extent interests do
influence policy actors’ cognition. Model 3, which combines personal and organ-
izational interests, accounts for 11% of the variation of the dependent variable.
This means that interests definitely influence the course of policy actors’ thoughts
regarding policies. At the same time, this shows that 89% of the variation is
explained by other factors. Those factors could of course be other forms of interests
which have not been operationalized in this study, but also other types of non-
materialistic beliefs and arguments (e.g., ‘‘I have become more favorable to this
policy because it has improved the public service’’). Hence, those results allow
rejection of the null hypothesis that interests do not influence policy processes
(Hoberg, 1996; Nohrstedt, 2005). At the same time, they quantitatively confirm
that much variation in policy actors’ preferences over time results from various
kinds of policy beliefs and not only from purely egocentric, material interests
(Ku¨bler, 2001; Lau and Heldman, 2009; Martinussen, 2008; Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
Policy actors experience an ‘‘interest shift’’
In this section, I examine whether the importance that respondents give to their
interests in their everyday lives has a moderation effect on the relation between
their policy interests and the evolution of their policy preferences. In regression
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models, such effect is assessed with the examination of the interaction term between
the moderating variable and the main variable (Hayes, 2013). Model 4 shows that
the interaction term between the importance of personal interests and personal
policy interests is insignificant. Similarly, Model 5 suggests that the moderation
effect of the importance of organizational interests on the relation between organ-
izational policy interests and the evolution of policy preferences is insignificant.
Hence, hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 cannot be validated. In other words, this study
suggests that the importance that a policy actor gives to his interests in his everyday
life does not influence the alignment of his policy preferences with his policy inter-
ests over time.
As mentioned above, prospect theory (Barberis, 2012; Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) has already been used in theACF to explain the ‘‘devil shift’’. According to this
shift, opposed policy actors see each other as more ‘‘devil’’ than they actually are. As
individuals are naturally loss averse, policy actors exaggerate the risks represented
by their political opponents (Leach and Sabatier, 2005; Sabatier et al., 1987).
Consistent with prospect theory too, the results of the present study suggest the
existence of another shift, namely: an ‘‘interest shift’’. Policy actors determine
which policy options serve their interests best and maintain or strengthen their
preferences for those options in the long run. However, the intensity of this
interests–learning relation is independent from the generalized importance of inter-
ests. Rather, policy actors are averse to opt for policies which involve personal loss,
even if they do not pay much importance to their interests in their everyday lives.
This finding also confirms that policy actors’ rationality is bounded rather than
perfect (Sabatier and Weible, 2007; Simon, 1991).
Organizational policy interests are more decisive than personal policy
interests
The comparison of Models 1, 2, and 3 suggests that organizational policy interests
are a more decisive factor of policy learning than personal policy interests. The effect
of personal policy interests (Model 1) becomes insignificant when organizational
policy interests are introduced in the model (Model 3). The reverse is not true: the
effect of organizational policy interests (Model 2) remains significant when personal
policy interests are introduced (Model 3). Similar conclusions may be drawn from
the analysis of the BIC index: the introduction of organizational policy interests
(Model 2) reduces the BIC more than the introduction of personal policy interests
(Model 1). Furthermore, the introduction of personal policy interests next to organ-
izational interests (Model 3) slightly increases the BIC index, compared to a model
in which only organizational interests are present (Model 2). Hence, respondents’
personal policy interests are statistically less useful to account for the evolution of
their policy preferences.
This result could be interpreted in terms of mediation—policy actors perceiving
the effect of the liberalization policy on their personal interests ‘‘through’’ the effect
of this policy on their organization. A variable B has a mediation effect on the
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relation between an independent variable A and a dependent variable C only if all
the following effects are significant: A on C, A on B, and B on C. If this condition is
met, the effect of A on C in a full regression model (with B) is subtracted to the
same effect in a partial model (without B) to know the net mediating effect of B
(Hayes, 2013). This means that the net mediating effect of organizational policy
interests (B) on the relation between personal policy interests (A) and the evolution
of respondents’ policy preferences (C) equals 0.21  0.11¼ 0.10. In other words,
half of the effect of personal policy interests is mediated by the effect of organiza-
tional policy interests. This confirms the key role of organizational interests (rather
than purely personal interests) in shaping policy actors’ preferences over time.
Conclusion
The ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) is a theory which considers the role of
policy learning in policy change processes. Policy learning is a cognitive and social
dynamic in which new information and knowledge resulting from various experi-
ences and interactions can elicit enduring alterations of policy actors’ preferences
regarding policies. Those alterations have been the dependent variable of this
study.
This study has demonstrated that policy actors tend to align their policy pref-
erences with their interests over time. This tendency, however, is limited. In add-
ition, it is independent from the importance that policy actors give to their interests
in their everyday lives, which suggests that policy actors are subject to a sort of
‘‘interest shift’’, when they assess policy options. Finally, when policy actors revise
their policy preferences, the perceived impact of policies on their own material well-
being (personal policy interests) is less decisive than the perceived impact of policies
on the material prosperity of the organization which they are affiliated to (organ-
izational policy interests).
As suggested by previous studies (Hoberg, 1996; Nohrstedt, 2005), these results
shed new light on the exact influence of policy actors’ interests on policy learning
and policy change. The hypotheses of the research were based on implications of
the ACF model of the individual, drawn from organizational research (Simon,
1991) and behavioral economics (prospect theory: Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). This model recognizes the bounded rationality of policy actors, the idea-
tional character of interests, as well as a double logic of normative reasoning—
a logic of consequences and one of appropriateness. As the results fit those
assumptions, they provide new support to the validity of this model. This is not
only relevant for the community of ACF researchers but also for scientists using
the various policy approaches based on a similar model of the individual (Dunlop
and Radaelli, 2013; Zito and Schout, 2009), as well as the researchers looking at the
role of interests in social and political attitudes (see Sears and Funk, 1991; as well
as subsequent studies).
This study opens several avenues for future research. First, future studies could
look at the social practices and institutional settings that increase or decrease
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the influence of interests on policy learning and policy change (i.e., the contexts in
which the ‘‘interest shift’’ is stronger or weaker). Second, the internal consistency
among answers to a cross-sectional survey can be artificially higher than in a panel
study. If possible, longitudinal data should be privileged in future studies on policy
learning. Third, I used self-reported measures for the importance policy actors pay
to their interests in their everyday lives. This can draw socially desirable answers.
This potential problem could be overcome by using vignette questions, in which
respondents have to report how they would behave in given contexts. Fourth, this
study used a classical ACF approach, in which the focus is on one output of policy
learning: the evolution of policy actors’ preferences (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,
1993). However, individual learning is also a process of knowledge acquisition and
translation (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). As knowledge acquisition and translation
also contribute to the emergence of shared understandings of policy problems and
solutions (Leach et al., 2014), future research could also look at the effects of
psychological factors, such as interests, on this process.
To conclude, this study suggests that policy actors assess and revise their policy
preferences over time using filtering lenses such as the perceived consequences of
policy programs on their material interests. However, the influence of this filter is
rather limited and policy actors seem open to many other forms of arguments. This
finding suggests to policy practitioners that policy actors could be effectively con-
vinced of the strengths and weaknesses of a policy program with arguments based
on various values or societal norms, and not only on their interests. This confirms
one of the fundamental intuitions of the ACF.
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Notes
1. For example, in the round 2012 of the European Social Survey, the mean of the variable
‘‘imprich’’ (importance given to ‘‘being rich, having money, and expensive things’’) in
Belgium was 4.12 while it was 3.99 with a standard deviation of 1.47 in the other
countries.
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2. The relevant policy actors were first identified thanks to a documentary analysis. Then, a
snowballing (or ‘‘chain referral’’) sampling method was applied thanks to a campaign of
33 preliminary semi-structured interviews. Finally, within each participating organiza-
tion, I included in the survey all members from the highest to the lowest organizational
level where, according to the interviewees, at least several actors could be identified as
relevant respondents to my survey. I applied this ‘‘hierarchical correction’’ (i.e. including
all people at the lowest relevant hierarchical level) to compensate for the tendency of the
snowball sampling procedure to over-represent ‘‘well-connected’’ actors and to under-
represent ‘‘unconnected’’ actors (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). There are at least three rea-
sons to think that the survey allows to look at long-term policy learning in a valid way.
First, most respondents had much professional seniority. Indeed, an additional question
of the survey demonstrates that 67.93% of the respondents had worked for more than 10
years in their sector; 13.32% between 5 and 10 years; 14.40% between two and four years;
and only 4.35% one year or less. Second, the implementation of the European liberal-
ization policy is a long-term process that began much before that the first Belgian-level
policy decision was made (e.g., European-level consultations of Belgian actors, prepar-
ation of the implementation within each national industry, etc.). Since then, this process
has progressively unfolded. Still nowadays, there are very important decisions that are
and need to be made, in each sector, to implement the liberalization policy in Belgium
(e.g., the introduction of competition in the national railway transport of passengers).
This means that, not only the most experienced policy actors, but also the less experi-
enced ones are able to compare periods before and periods after that important policy
changes related to the liberalization policy occurred. Third, the analyses were repeated on
the 32.07% of respondents with less 10 years of seniority. Those respondents, compared
to their more experienced counterparts, reported alterations of their policy preferences
that are not significantly different. In addition, the regression analyses on this specific set
of respondents lead to similar results.
3. The following types of organizations were invited to participate in the survey within each
sector: all competent public administrations, all competent regulatory agencies, the infra-
structure manager, the incumbent, all new entrants, as well as the interest groups repre-
senting the workers (e.g., trade unions or associations of train drivers) and the different
types of companies (e.g., associations of public-sector train companies or associations of
green producers). Beyond this set of organizations, there is a broader set of actors
involved in mobility or energy issues (e.g., environmental organizations). However, the
preliminary qualitative interviews of the research suggested that their role in the imple-
mentation of the liberalization process was not significant. Hence, they were not invited
to participate in the survey. The survey was relayed among policy actors within 16 organ-
izations in the railways and 35 organizations in the electricity sector. This is consistent
with the structure of the two sectors: in Belgium, the railways are a federal competence
and the incumbent still holds a prominent role in the exploitation of the network (it still
holds a monopoly on national services of passenger transport). In contrast, the compe-
tences on the electricity sector are shared among the federal State and the Regions. In
addition, a myriad of new private companies (or ‘‘new entrants’’) compete with the
incumbent for the provision of electricity to citizens and companies. Hence, it is
normal to find more organizations in the electricity sector than in the rail sector. In
the railways, 12 (75%) out of the 16 organizations participated in the survey, while in
the electricity sector, there were 26 (74%) participating organizations out of the 35 that
were contacted. A higher (absolute) number of organizations declined the invitation in
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the electricity sector, probably because of the higher number of smaller organizations in
this sector: those organizations are not able or willing to devote resources to the partici-
pation in surveys. Within the participating organizations, in the railways, 199 out of 560
(35.53%) solicited policy actors participated in the survey, while in the electricity sector,
214 out of 696 (30.75%) policy actors filled in the questionnaire, which is fairly similar.
4. In the exploratory factor analysis (Costello and Osborne, 2005), principal axis factoring
was used. This is appropriate when items are not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk tests
were conducted on each change score and rejected the normality hypothesis). Factors
with eigenvalues higher than 1.0 were retained (factors 1 and 2 had eigenvalues of 1.25
and 0.02 in the rail sector; they had eigenvalues of 1.53 and 0.04 in the electricity
sector). After rotation, all items had loadings equal or higher to 0.32. Most researchers
consider that 0.30 is a reasonable cut-off value to decide whether an item should or
should not be retained in a factor (e.g., Costello and Osborne, 2005; DiStefano et al.,
2009; Whitley and Kite, 2013: 345). Hence, the four items were retained in each of the two
sectors. Confirmatory factor analysis (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2005) was performed
with maximum likelihood procedure. Starting values of the parameters were set to one,
except for the covariance parameters, which were set to 0.5. This is appropriate when
working on standardized variables with positive covariances (Kolenikov, 2009). Factors
scores were computed with the Bartlett method because this method provides unbiased
scores (Hershberger, 2005). In general, good model fit is indicated by values of the
RMSEA lower than 0.60, values of the CFI higher than 0.90, values of the SRMR
lower than 0.08, as well as a p values of the chi square test higher than 0.05 (i.e., failure
to reject the null hypothesis of good fit). Note, however, that RMSEA¼ 0.00 and
CFI¼ 1.00 can indicate that 2< df, rather than a perfect fit. Akaike information criter-
ion (AIC) and BIC indices can also be used to compare factor structures, lower AIC and
BIC indicating better structures. In this study, the four-item structure of the dependent
variable has a RMSEA of 0.00 and a CFI of 1.00. Deleting change score 3 (‘‘The
unbundling of operations on, and management of, railway infrastructure’’) and change
score 4 (‘‘The application of regulation by independent regulatory bodies in the rail-
ways’’) would slightly improve the AIC/BIC indices of the CFA as well as the
Cronbach alpha (ac), which is acceptable in electricity sector (ac¼ 0.72) but, admittedly,
a little bit questionable in the rail sector (ac¼ 0.62). There are, however, three reasons to
keep the four-item structure. First, ac are not weighted whereas factor scores depend on
the loading of each item which compose the factor structure. Hence, a factor is a more
appropriate measure of the dependent variable than a simple addition of the change
scores. Second, and this is probably a consequence of the first reason, the other fit stat-
istics of the CFA (chi square test and SRMR) indicate a very good fit. Third, the four-
item structure is grounded in the literature on the European liberalization process of
network industries, which suggests that this structure is more representative of this
policy than shorter structures (Genoud, 2004; Geradin, 2006).
5. Individual predictions raised fewer questions: the proportion of studentized residuals
falling outside [2;+2] as well as the Cook’s distance had acceptable levels in all
simple regression models. This is still the case in the clustered robust models.
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Appendix 1
Items of the variables
Table 6. Items of the dependent variable in the electricity sector.
Change, between 1999 and 2012,
in respondents’ favorableness to. . . Mean Std Dev
Correlation
with total
Alpha
without
this variable
The introduction of competition in the
generation and supply of high-voltage
electricity (professional customers)
0.11 1.02 0.59 0.62
The introduction of competition in the
generation and supply of low-voltage
electricity (households)
0.39 1.13 0.61 0.61
The unbundling of generation/supply and
transport/distribution of electricity
0.18 1.03 0.50 0.67
The application of regulation by
independent regulatory bodies
in the electricity sector
0.42 0.98 0.37 0.75
Total Cronbach coefficient alpha: 0.72
Table 5. Items of the dependent variable in the rail sector.
Change, between 1997 and 2012,
in respondents’ favorableness to. . . Mean Std Dev
Correlation
with total
Alpha
without
this variable
The introduction of competition in the railway
transport of freight
0.04 0.95 0.48 0.50
The introduction of competition in the inter-
national railway transport of passengers
0.12 0.94 0.57 0.46
The unbundling of operations on, and man-
agement of, the railway infrastructure
0.06 0.80 0.20 0.61
The application of regulation by independent
regulatory bodies in the railways
0.03 0.75 0.31 0.57
Total Cronbach coefficient alpha: 0.62
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Table 8. Items of the generalized importance given to personal interests.
‘‘I give some importance to my. . .’’ Mean Std Dev
Correlation
with total
Alpha without
this variable
Material working conditions 3.91 0.81 0.46 0.66
Professional opportunities 3.57 0.85 0.45 0.67
Salary 3.91 0.69 0.62 0.44
Total Cronbach coefficient alpha: 0.70
Table 9. Items of organizational policy interests.
‘‘The European liberalization policy process
has had a positive influence on. . .’’ Mean Std Dev
Correlation
with total
Alpha without
this variable
The success of my organization 2.90 1.17 0.63
The finances of my organization 2.55 1.07 0.63
Total Cronbach coefficient alpha: 0.77
Table 10. Items of the generalized importance given to organizational interests.
‘‘I give some importance to. . .’’ Mean Std Dev
Correlation
with total
Alpha without
this variable
The success of my organization 4.46 0.62 0.58
The finances of my organization 4.39 0.63 0.58
Total Cronbach coefficient alpha: 0.73
Table 7. Items of personal policy interests.
‘‘The European liberalization policy process
has had a positive influence on my. . .’’ Mean Std Dev
Correlation
with total
Alpha without
this variable
Material working conditions 2.71 0.98 0.60 0.68
Professional opportunities 2.94 1.19 0.59 0.68
Salary 2.44 1.06 0.59 0.68
Total Cronbach coefficient alpha: 0.76
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